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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2011, the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office in Conroe, Texas used
1
federal grant funds to purchase a ShadowHawk unmanned helicopter drone. The
Sheriff’s Office was excited to be “on the ground floor” of utilizing drone
2
technology for police operations. This particular drone could hold a camera
3
system along with “a variety of ‘less lethal’ munitions.” The Sheriff’s Office
believed “drones armed with an array of non-lethal force options . . . could save
4
lives.” While the Sheriff’s Office had no immediate plans to use non-lethal
weapons on their ShadowHawk drone, Chief Deputy Sheriff Randy McDaniel
5
stated that using armed drones was “certainly something that we could look at.”
In response to the growing interest in drone use, Congress passed the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FAA Act), effectively giving a green
light to federal and domestic law enforcement agencies around the United States
6
to begin using unmanned aircraft systems or drones in their daily operations. The
majority of legal debate over domestic drone use focuses on the Fourth
Amendment search standards and privacy issues involved with allowing a law
enforcement agency (LEA) to use an unarmed drone equipped with a camera or
7
other surveillance equipment, on United States citizens. Commentators have not
1. Stephen Dean, New Police Drone Near Houston Could Carry Weapons, CLICK2HOUSTON (Nov. 10,
2011, 1:51 PM), http://www.click2houston.com/news/New-Police-Drone-Near-Houston-Could-Carry-Weapons
/-/1735978/4717922/-/59xnnez/-/index.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
2. Id.
3. Buck Sexton, Aerial ‘Shadowhawk’ Police Drones Can Now Deploy Tasers & Tear Gas, THE BLAZE
(Mar. 12, 2012, 4:03 PM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2012/03/12/want-to-see-the-aerial-drone-policecould-soon-deploy-in-your-town/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
4. Id. (noting that “these are technologies ‘law enforcement utilizes day in and day out’ already”).
5. Id.
6. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–95, §§ 334–36, 126 Stat. 11, 72–77.
(“Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall enter into
agreements with appropriate government agencies to simplify the process for issuing certificates
of waiver or authorization with respect to applications seeking authorization to operate public
unmanned aircraft systems in the national airspace system.”).
7. See, e.g., Timothy T. Takahashi, Drones and Privacy, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 72, 77 (2012)
(addressing various issues surrounding law enforcement’s use of a drone for surveillance purposes); JAY
STANLEY & CATHERINE CRUMP, PROTECTING PRIVACY FROM AERIAL SURVEILLANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR GOVERNMENT USE OF DRONE AIRCRAFT 15–16 (Dec. 2011), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
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discussed how the use of an armed drone by a law enforcement officer will affect
use of force (UOF) standards under the Fourth Amendment or whether the
standards need to change. This is an important debate for two reasons. First,
8
LEAs will inevitably use armed drones due to the reduced costs and increased
9
officer safety associated with operating a drone. Second, as LEA’s interest in
10
armed drones grows, concern among civil rights groups about the domestic use
11
of armed drones increases. This Comment argues that allowing domestic LEAs
to operate armed drones in order to protect the public is constitutional, but will
likely require agencies to create a separate armed drone UOF policy to address
material differences in how an officer uses armed force with a drone and to
provide guidance for officers in the field.
Part II of this Comment examines the evolution of drone technology from its
use in the military to current and potential uses in the United States, with a focus
on LEAs. Part III considers the legal basis for a LEA’s ability to use and operate
drones in national airspace. Additionally, this section discusses pertinent parts of
the FAA Act dealing with public agency drone use, current drone rules
implemented as a result of the FAA Act, and federal and state responses to the
FAA Act. Part IV addresses public policy issues concerning the use of armed
drones in the United States. Part V discusses the Fourth Amendment and the
protectingprivacyfromaerialsurveillance.pdf [hereinafter PROTECTING PRIVACY FROM AERIAL SURVEILLANCE]
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing recommendations on ensuring privacy from surveillance
drones); Surveillance Drones, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/surveillance-drones
(last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating concerns over privacy law and
drone technology).
8. See, e.g., Dean, supra note 1 (quoting the chief executive officer of drone manufacturer Vanguard
Defense Industries who said their drones “are designed to carry weapons for local law enforcement.”).
9. See Stephanie Chuang, Bay Area Law Enforcement Agencies Test Drones, NBCBAYAREA.COM (Feb.
14, 2013, 2:53 PM), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Bay-Area-Law-Enforcement-Agencies-TestDrones-173415551.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating LEAs are considering drones as a
“cost-cutting way to replace helicopters, and use technology to fight crime and save lives”). Drones could be
used in place of helicopters as security for national high-risk targets. See Black Hawk Helicopters, Armed
Agents Prepared for Super Bowl, CBSNewYORK (Jan. 30, 2014, 5:41 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/
2014/01/30/black-hawk-helicopters-armed-agents-prepared-for-super-bowl/ (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (reporting on the use of Black Hawk helicopters “armed with heavy weaponry . . . to bring down an
aircraft” if necessary during the Super Bowl).
10. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, CONCEPT OF
OPERATIONS FOR CBP’S PREDATOR B UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM. 63 (June 2010), available at
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/cbp_uas_concept_of_operations.pdf [hereinafter U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROT.] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Additional payload upgrades [on drones] could include
expendables or non-lethal weapons designed to immobilize [targets of interest].”); Sexton, supra note 3 (stating
an opinion of a Texas LEA that “drones armed with an array of non-lethal force options—including impact
rounds, chemical munition rounds, and tasers—could save lives”).
11. See Chris Calabrese & Jay Stanley, Ban on Arming Domestic Drones: Let’s Draw a Line in the Sand,
ACLU (June 15, 2012, 7:44 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-free-speech-nationalsecurity/ban-arming-domestic-drones [hereinafter Ban on Arming Domestic Drones] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (arguing that no armed drones should be used in the United States); Jennifer Lynch,
Customs & Border Protection Considered Weaponizing Drones, EFF (July 2, 2013), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2013/07/customs-border-protection-considered-weaponizing-drones (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (stating the CBP should “not equip its Predators with any weapons—lethal or otherwise”).
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UOF, including an explanation of unreasonable seizures and the appropriate UOF
standard, the application of that standard to armed drones, and a discussion of
whether armed drones require a new UOF standard. Part VI offers a comparison
of current state and federal UOF policies and provides a model armed drone UOF
policy in order to allow an officer to use an armed drone and stay within
established Fourth Amendment principles. Part VII concludes that domestic
armed drone use by an officer is constitutional but requires either a separate
armed drone UOF policy or modification of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
reasonableness test in order to protect the public from excessive force.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF DRONE TECHNOLOGY
12

Drones have evolved significantly since the military began using them
13
regularly in 2001. This section explores the non-military uses of drones as well
as the expansion of drone technology for domestic law enforcement.
A. Drones Used for War: What Else Are They Good For?
In 2001, the U.S. military began using drones for reconnaissance purposes in
14
Afghanistan. In 2002, the military added “Hellfire missiles” to its Predator
drone system, “enabling reaction against intelligence, surveillance, and
15
reconnaissance, close air support, and interdiction targets.” Since then, the
military and other private companies have continued to develop and deploy
16
drones of various sizes and capabilities. Today, drones are actively used for

12. Drones are “airborne vehicles that fly without an onboard human pilot, most often consisting of an
aircraft, ground-based operating personnel, and one of various types of communications networks to connect the
two.” Jeewon Kim et al., Unmanned Aerial Systems, 9 No. 4 A.B.A. SCITECH LAW. 54, 54–55 (2013). While
drones are commonly thought of as aerial vehicles, there is a growing interest in other types of drones including
ground drones and underwater drones. See, e.g., Armed Ground Drones to Take Over Battlefields in 5 Years,
RT.COM, (Oct. 21, 2013, 8:57 PM), http://rt.com/usa/robotics-rodeo-ground-drones-512/ (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (stating a growing interest by the military in ground drones); Will Connors,
Underwater Drones are Multiplying Fast, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2013, 7:55 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424127887324183204578565460623922952 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating
a growing interest in underwater drones).
13. See generally Takahashi, supra note 7, at 83 (“[Drones] have seen considerable use overseas in the
run-up to—and the aftermath of—the Second Gulf War. First generation drones carried only surveillance
electronics . . . [l]ater generation drones were adapted to perform ‘hunter/killer’ missions; they carry both
surveillance electronics and weapons.”).
14. See generally Fact Sheet RQ-4 Global Hawk, U.S. AIR FORCE (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.af.mil/
AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104516/rq-4-global-hawk.aspx (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (“The Global Hawk UAS provides near-continuous adverse-weather, day/night, wide area
reconnaissance and surveillance.”).
15. Fact Sheet, MQ-1B Predator, U.S. AIR FORCE (July 10, 2010), http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/
FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104469/mq-1b-predator.aspx (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
16. See PROTECTING PRIVACY FROM AERIAL SURVEILLANCE, supra note 7, at 2–3 (listing various types
of drones to include: “large fixed-wing,” “small fixed-wing,” drones that fit inside a backpack, drones the size
of a small bird, and “blimps”).
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various non-military applications including rescue, agricultural, and
17
environmental operations. Potential future uses include “firefighting, flood
monitoring, filmmaking, storm research, mining, aerial news coverage,
18
construction, real-estate, cargo, [and] communications.”
B. Drones for Law Enforcement: The New Frontier
As the Iraq and Afghanistan wars wind down and the United States opens the
national airspace for drone use, drone manufacturers are shifting their focus
towards offering LEAs unarmed, high-tech surveillance drones and armed
drones.
1. Drones for Domestic Surveillance
19

The majority of debate over a LEA’s drone use centers on surveillance.
20
Several drone manufacturers tailor their drones to law enforcement operations
21
by equipping drones with digital cameras, a Forward Looking Infrared (“FLIR”)
22
system, and “advanced data collection and storage, as well as the live streaming
23
of data in the form of videos . . . . [and] GPS connectivity.” Drone denouncers
argue that the use of surveillance drones “infringes upon fundamental privacy

17. See MICHAEL TOSCANO, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS ROADMAP TO THE FUTURE, ASSOCIATION
UNMANNED VEHICLE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL 18 (2013), available at http://www.ncsl.org/
documents/environ/MToscano-5-4-13.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (citing examples of drone
use to include: saving a life in a vehicle accident, “spraying crops for pest control,” and monitoring “wildlife
species”).
18. Id. at 10. Additionally, drones are being considered for a myriad of other potential applications. See
Kim, supra note 12, at 59 (listing “potential personal uses of [drones]” to include: “adventure photography,
science and discovery, child/pet monitoring, [and] herd[ing] animals”).
19. See RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, DRONES IN DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH
AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 1 (Apr. 3, 2013), available at http://www.
fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42701.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the widely contested
debate over the use of drones in “domestic surveillance operations”).
20. See, e.g., Public Safety, Law Enforcement, VANGUARD DEF. INDUS., http://vanguarddefense.
com/public-safety/law-enforcement/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) [hereinafter VANGUARD DEF. INDUS.] (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Vanguard Defense Industries is committed to supporting our public safety
professional with an exceptional platform [UAS] to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance and apprehension.”);
Who We Serve, SWAT & Police Robot, ARA FORCE PROTECTION, http://www.araforcepro.com/who-weserve/first-responder-police/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (offering
products including a “Nighthawk Micro UA[S]” to law enforcement); Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Qube:
Public Safety Small UAS, AV AEROVIRONMENT, http://www.avinc.com/uas/small_uas/qube/ (last visited Mar.
15, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (offering a small UAS to first responders capable of
“transmitting live video directly to the operator”).
21. REG’L CMTY. POLICING TRAINING INST. AT WICHITA ST. U., FORWARD LOOKING INFRARED (FLIR) 1,
available at http://webs.wichita.edu/depttools/depttoolsmemberfiles/rcpi/COPS%20Act%20Papers/COPS%20
ACT%20FLIR.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“[FLIR] is a night vision enhancement system
with many potential applications in law enforcement agencies.”).
22. VANGUARD DEF. INDUS., supra note 20.
23. Kim, supra note 12, at 55.
FOR
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24

interests and the ability to freely associate with others.” Those in favor of drone
use argue that it has many benefits including “protecting public safety, patrolling
our nation’s borders, and investigating and enforcing environmental and criminal
25
law violations.” Despite the benefits of surveillance drones, as more
26
government agencies use them, individuals may experience diminished privacy.
However, as LEAs subject the public to increased drone surveillance, it may
ultimately give the Supreme Court the opportunity to address privacy laws in
27
light of these new technologies.
2. Armed Drones for Law Enforcement
As LEAs consider ways to cut costs while still protecting the public, drones
28
have become increasingly more attractive. Currently, drones built for law
enforcement or military purposes can be equipped with many different types of
weapons. For example, Vanguard Defense Industries’ ShadowHawk drone can
be “fitted with a variety of ‘less lethal’ munitions” which may include “impact
29
rounds, chemical munition rounds, and tasers.” Vanguard also offers lethal
weapons on the ShadowHawk, including: a “single or multiple shot 40mm
grenade launcher, 25mm Grenade Launcher, [and a] 12g [gauge] shotgun” but
presently drone manufacturers do not offer these lethal weapon capabilities to
30
LEAs.

24. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 1.
25. Id.
26. Takahashi, supra note 7, at 113.
27. Id. This important legal debate over the use of drones for surveillance purposes and their potential
Fourth Amendment violation has been written about extensively and is beyond the scope of this Comment. See,
e.g., id. at 77 (addressing various issues surrounding the police use of a drone for surveillance purposes); Chris
Schlag, The New Privacy Battle: How the Expanding Use of Drones Continues to Erode Our Concept of
Privacy and Privacy Rights, 13 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2013); Ajoke Oyegunle, Drones in the
Homeland: A Potential Privacy Obstruction Under the Fourth Amendment and the Common Law Trespass
Doctrine, 21 COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 365, 366 (2013).
28. See Therese Postel, State Police Increasingly Turn to Drones to Monitor U.S. Citizens, POLICYMIC
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.policymic.com/articles/3433/state-police-increasingly-turn-to-drones-to-monitor-us-citizens (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (highlighting potential financial and safety benefits drone
use offers to a LEA).
29. Sexton, supra note 3. A taser is a “weapon that subdues its targets with jolts of electricity.” Bruce
Weber, Jack Cover, 88, Physicist Who Invented the Taser Stun Gun, Dies, NY TIMES (Feb. 16, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/16/us/16cover.html?_r=0 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Jack
Cover invented the first taser which he originally called the “Thomas Swift Electric Rifle” or TSER and later
added the A to create the acronym TASER. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Vanguard Defense Industries
is not the only company developing drones with non-lethal weapon capabilities. A firm called Chaotic Moon
recently created a drone helicopter armed with an 80,000 volt taser deployable by its remote pilot. Brent Rose,
Meet CUPID: The Drone That Will Shoot You with an 80,000 Volt Taser, GIZMODO (Mar. 7, 2014, 6:40 PM),
http://gizmodo.com/meet-cupid-the-drone-that-will-shoot-you-with-an-80-00-1539064715/all (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
30. Specifications, VANGUARD DEF. INDUS., http://vanguarddefense.com/specifications/ (last visited Mar.
15, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) currently uses Predator
drones to patrol the United States’ borders and has allowed the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), Secret Service, Texas Rangers, and other local law
31
enforcement to use Predator drones in similar situations. While LEAs currently
use these drones only for surveillance purposes, a DHS report to Congress in
2010 left open the idea of placing “non-lethal weapons designed to immobilize
32
[targets of interest]” on the Predator drones.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress has passed a number of laws in an effort to establish a legal
framework for the domestic use of military grade force. Two bear relevance on
33
34
drone usage in the United States: The Posse Comitatus Act and the FAA Act.
A. The Legality of LEA Drone Usage Under the Posse Comitatus Act
Since the time of the Revolutionary War, the United States has grappled with
how and to what extent local agencies should use federal military forces and
35
equipment to enforce domestic law. In the aftermath of the Civil War, federal
troops under the authority of the President established a “cruel and freewheeling
36
martial law” in the southern states. Recognizing the problem with this
unchecked use of military authority, Congress enacted the Posse Comitatus Act
37
in 1878. Over the years, federal courts have interpreted, and Congress has
codified, exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act.
In United States v. Red Feather, a district court found that the Posse
Comitatus Act “does not [pertain to] the use of Army or Air Force equipment or
38
material.” The court went on to state that “[t]he prevention of the use of military
supplies and equipment was never mentioned in the debates [over the Posse

31. Declan McCullagh, DHS Build Domestic Surveillance Tech into Predator Drones, CNET (Mar. 2,
2013, 11:30 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57572207-38/dhs-built-domestic-surveillance-tech-intopredator-drones/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
32. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., supra note 10, at 63.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006).
34. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–95, §§ 331–36, 126 Stat. 11, 72–77.
35. John D. Gates, Don’t Call Out the Marines: An Assessment of the Posse Comitatus Act, 13 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 1467, 1470–73 (1982).
36. Id. at 1472–73.
37. Id. at 1473. The current version of the The Posse Comitatus Act states:
“Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or
Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or
otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both.”
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006).
38. 392 F. Supp. 916, 921 (D.S.D. 1975).
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39

Comitatus Act], nor can it reasonably be read into the words of the Act.”
Additionally, Congress codified express authorization of the use of military
equipment and facilities to “any Federal, State, or local civilian law enforcement
40
official for law enforcement purposes.” More recently, officers in North Dakota
called in a Predator drone from a local Air Force base to provide surveillance
during a standoff situation resulting in “the first known arrests of U.S. citizens on
41
U.S. soil with help from a Predator.” Some legal scholars believe this scenario
did not violate Posse Comitatus, even though the drone was based out of an Air
Force base, because it belonged to the United States Customs and Border
42
Protection (CBP). Therefore, a LEA’s use of a non-military armed drone likely
does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act so long as the LEA owns the drone and
43
the military does not become directly involved.
B. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act
In 2012, Congress passed the FAA Act giving the Secretary of
Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and other federal
44
agencies the authority to create a plan for public drone use. Additionally, the
FAA Act requires the Secretary of Transportation to form agreements with
“appropriate government agencies to simplify the process for issuing certificates
45
46
of waiver or authorization . . . to operate public unmanned aircraft systems” in
47
United States airspace. The FAA Act lists specific requirements that

39. Id. at 922; see also U.S. v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (D. Neb. 1974) (finding no violation of
the Posse Comitatus Act by a LEA using “1,100 Star parachute flares, 100,000 rounds, M-16 ammunition, 100
protective vests, 20 sniper rifles, [and] 15 unarmed armored personnel carriers” from the Army).
40. 10 U.S.C § 372 (2012).
41. Takahashi, supra note 7, at 74–75 (alteration accepted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Michael Peck, Predator Drone Sends North Dakota Man to Jail, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2014, 7:27 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2014/01/27/predator-drone-sends-north-dakota-man-to-jail/ (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the conviction of the suspects arrested in North Dakota with the
aid of a Predator drone).
42. Takahashi, supra note 7, at 79. If the Predator was owned and operated by the Air Force when it
assisted police, would the Posse Comitatus Act apply? See id. (stating Posse Comitatus applies only if there is
direct involvement by the military).
43. Id.
44. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. 11, 72–77.
45. Id. § 334(c)(1). Since passage of the Act, the FAA has issued hundreds of certificates of authorization.
See FOIA Responses, Public Operations (Governmental), Unmanned Aircraft Systems, FAA (last updated Aug.
4, 2014), http://www.faa.gov/uas/public_operations/foia_responses/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(showing a breakdown of approved COA’s since April 26, 2012).
46. A “‘public unmanned aircraft system’” must meet the same criteria as a public aircraft. FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 331, 126 Stat. 11, 72–77. A “‘public aircraft’” is
any aircraft owned by the federal or state government or “a political subdivision of one of these governments.”
49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(41) (2006).
47. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 334(c)(1), 126 Stat. 11, 72–77
(2012).
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48

government agencies must follow in order to operate a drone over U.S. soil.
There is nothing in the FAA Act prohibiting or approving any type of armed
49
drone use in the United States.
50

1. The FAA UAS Comprehensive Plan
The FAA Act requires the Secretary of Transportation to meet with members
51
of the aviation industry, Federal agencies that use drones, and members of the
drone industry to “develop a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate the
52
integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace
53
system.” The plan provides the “overarching, interagency goals, objectives and
54
approach.” It also acknowledges the need to consider various privacy and civil
liberty concerns, but does not specifically mention the use of armed drones by
55
LEAs. Instead, the plan emphasizes the need to keep these civil liberty issues in
mind as the collaborating members work to integrate drones into the national
56
airspace system.
When asked about the use of armed drones in the United States, Jim
Williams, the head of the FAA’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration Office,
emphasized that “existing rules already bar aircraft from using weapons” and
57
those rules also apply to drones. Specifically, he mentioned that there are “rules
in the books that deal with releasing anything from an aircraft, period. Those
rules are in place and that would prohibit weapons from being installed on a civil
58
aircraft.” A federal regulation states that “[n]o pilot in command of a civil
48. See id. § 334(c)(2)(C) (stating the unmanned aircraft must weigh “4.4 pounds or less . . . operate[] (i)
within the line of sight of the operator; (ii) less than 400 feet above the ground; (iii) during daylight conditions;
(iv) within Class G airspace; and (v) outside of 5 statute miles from any . . . location with aviation activities”).
49. Id.
50. UAS stands for “Unmanned Aircraft System.” Id. § 331(9).
51. Members included “the Departments of Transportation, Defense, Commerce, and Homeland Security
as well as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Federal Aviation Administration.” THE
JOINT PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSPORTATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
(UAS) COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, A REPORT ON THE NATION’S UAS PATH FORWARD 6 (2013), available at
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agi/reports/media/UAS_Comprehensive_Plan.pdf
[hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE PLAN] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
52. A “‘civil aircraft’ means any aircraft except a public aircraft.” 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(16) (2006).
53. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. 11, 72–77
(2012).
54. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 51, at 6.
55. See id. at 7 (stating the significance of “privacy and civil liberties, physical security, and potential
economic opportunities . . . in the development of [drone] policy”).
56. See id. (“Integrating public and civil [drones] into the [national airspace] carries certain national
security implications, including cyber and communications security, domestic framework for US government
operations, national airspace and defense, airman vetting/general aviation, and privacy concerns.”).
57. Ben Wolfgang, FAA Official: No Armed Drones in U.S., WASH. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/13/faa-official-no-armed-drones-us/?page=all (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review). Members of the audience “scoffed at the question” and Mr. Williams “seemed amused by it.” Id.
58. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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aircraft may allow any object to be dropped from that aircraft in flight that
59
creates a hazard to persons or property.” Presuming that (1) Mr. Williams was
referring to this rule in his answer, and (2) the word “object” in the rule includes
60
a weapon, this rule applies only to civil aircraft and not public aircraft. The
current text of the rule does not seem to forbid a LEA from arming its “public”
61
drone.
2. The FAA Integration of UAS Roadmap
The FAA Act requires the FAA to produce a five-year roadmap, through
62
2017, for “the introduction of civil [drones] into the national airspace system.”
The FAA serves as both a regulator of aviation safety and as a service provider of
63
air traffic control in the National Airspace System (NAS). The roadmap
acknowledges the challenge of establishing a policy and regulatory framework
64
for drone integration. It does not specifically mention armed drone use in the
United States, but notes the need to establish regulations based on several factors
65
in drone operations that could presumably include armed drones.
3. The Memorandum of Understanding Between the FAA and the DOJ
The FAA and the Department of Justice (DOJ) created a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) to “implement a streamlined training and authorization
process to enable [state] law enforcement agencies to operate [drones] within the
66
United States safely, effectively, and lawfully.” This MOU meets the FAA
Act’s requirement to “simplify the process for issuing certificates of waiver or

59. 14 C.F.R. § 91.15 (2014) (emphasis added).
60. See supra notes 46, 52. “[T]he FAA has no regulatory authority over [public aircraft operations] other
than those requirements that apply to all aircraft operating in the [national airspace] . . . [and generally]
regulations that include the term ‘civil aircraft’ in their applicability do not apply to [public aircraft
operations].” FAA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR, PUBLIC AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS 3 (Feb. 12,
2014), available at http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_00-1_1A.pdf (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
61. See supra text accompanying note 59.
62. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(5), 126 Stat. 11, 72–77.
63. FAA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., INTEGRATION OF CIVIL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) IN THE
NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM (NAS) ROADMAP 14 (1st ed. 2013), available at http://www.faa.gov/
about/initiatives/uas/media/uas_roadmap_2013.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 16 (“[R]egulatory drivers include: [d]eveloping minimum standards for Sense and Avoid,
Control and Communications . . . [u]nderstanding the privacy, security, and environmental implications of
[drone] operations . . . [a]nd developing acceptable [drone] design standards that consider the aircraft size,
performance, mode of control, intended operational environment, and mission criticality.”).
66. Memorandum of Understanding Between FAA, UAS Integration Office, & The U.S. DOJ, Office of
Justice Programs, Nat’l Inst. of Justice Concerning Operation of UAS by Law Enforcement Agencies 1 (2013),
available at http://www.alea.org/assets/pressReleases/assets/1805/DOJ%20FAA%20MOU.pdf [hereinafter
Memorandum of Understanding] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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67

authorization . . . to operate public [drones] in the [NAS].” Specifically, the
National Institute of Justice, under the DOJ, worked with the FAA to implement
68
the authorization of LEA drone use. The MOU establishes additional
69
requirements for a LEA to gain authorization to operate a drone and also
70
provides specific rules for flight operations.
C. Legislative Responses to the FAA Act
Amidst growing public concern about drone use in the United States,
including ease of LEA approval and ambiguity in the FAA Act, Congress and
state legislatures have proposed amendments to clarify how a LEA may use a
drone.
1. Federal Responses
On March 12, 2013, Rep. Michael Burgess introduced the No Armed Drones
71
Act of 2013 (NADA) as an amendment to the FAA Act. This amendment would
prohibit the Secretary of Transportation from authorizing anyone to use a drone
72
“as a weapon or to deliver a weapon against a person or property.” The
73
amendment defines a “weapon” to include both “lethal and nonlethal weapons.”
This amendment remains in the committee process and has not moved out of
74
committee since March 13, 2013.
2. State Responses: Split on Armed Drone Use
In 2013, forty-three states introduced ninety-six bills on domestic drone use,
75
and eight states ultimately passed new drone laws. The new state drone laws

67. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 334(c), 126 Stat. 11, 72–77
(2012).
68. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 66, at 2.
69. Id. at 5 (stating a LEA must submit a Safety Risk Analysis Plan, operate the drone in a “‘Defined
Incident Perimeter,’” (DIP) and only use drones that weigh no more than twenty-five pounds).
70. Id. at 7 (stating the LEA must operate the drone within a stationary DIP no higher than 400 feet above
ground level, during daylight hours, in the pilot and at least one observer’s sight, with no pursuit missions
outside the DIP, and no flights over groups of people or major roadways). While the MOU is helpful, it does not
establish permanent drone requirements because it is subject to change. Id. at 4.
71. No Armed Drones Act of 2013, H.R. 1083, 113th Cong. (2013).
72. Id.
73. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. CONGRESS.GOV, http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/1083 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
75. See Allie Bohm, The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of State Legislation Passed This Year, ACLU
(Nov. 7, 2013 8:50 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/year-drone-roundup-legislationpassed-year (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the drone laws passed by Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Montana, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, and Texas).
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76

take different approaches to armed drones. For example, Virginia completely
77
prohibits the use of armed drones. Florida’s definition of a lawful LEA drone
78
includes one that “[c]an carry a lethal or nonlethal payload.” Oregon’s drone
law states “[a] public body may not operate a drone that is capable of firing a
79
bullet or other projectile, directing a laser or otherwise being used as a weapon.”
80
Other states do not mention armed drones at all.
As states debate drone use, several groups have developed model rules or
81
points for state legislatures. The Aerospace States Association, the Council of
State Governments, and the National Conference of State Legislatures advise
states to consider “prohibiting weapons to be carried by any [drone] in
82
commercial airspace.” The International Association of Chiefs of Police
Aviation Committee (IACP) “strongly discourage[s]” any weapons on LEA
drones because it believes current technology will not give a LEA “the ability to
83
effectively deploy weapons from a small [drone].” The IACP also reasons that
“public acceptance of airborne use of force is likewise doubtful and could result
84
in unnecessary community resistance to the program.” However, this Comment
proposes model language for an armed drone UOF policy that strikes a better
balance of these concerns.

76. Id.
77. Va. Acts H.B 2012, Ch. 755 (2013).
78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50(2) (West Supp. 2013).
79. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 837.365 (West Supp. 2014).
80. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 167/5 (West Supp. 2014) (stating no language regarding armed
drones); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21–213 (West Supp. 2014) (stating no language regarding armed drones); TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.001 (West Supp. 2014) (stating no language regarding armed drones); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46–5–109 (West Supp. 2013) (stating no language regarding armed drones).
81. See AEROSPACE STATES ASS’N, UAS PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS 1–2 (2013), available at
http://aerostates.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/UAS-State-Privacy-Considerations-Final2.pdf (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that the Aerospace States Association, the Council of State Governments,
and the National Conference of State Legislatures have created considerations for legislators developing UAS
legislation).
82. Id. The FAA divides commercial airspace into several classes. FAA, U.S. DEP’T OF
TRANSPORTATION, AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION POLICY, ORDER JO 7400.9X § 1000 (Aug. 7, 2013), available
at http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/JO_7400.9X.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review). Generally, Class A airspace is an altitude of 18,000 feet and above. Id. at § 2000. The remaining Class
B, C, D, and E airspace altitude levels generally vary by state. Id. at § § 3000, 4000, 5000, 6000. Any airspace
not covered by one of these classes is uncontrolled and falls under Class G airspace. Id. at § 1000. The FAA Act
allows a LEA to operate a drone “less than 400 feet above the ground . . . within Class G airspace.” FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 334(c)(2)(C), 126 Stat. 11, 72–77 (2012).
83. AVIATION COMM., INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT 2 (2012), available at http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/iacp_uaguidelines.pdf (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
84. Id.
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IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Before a LEA uses an armed drone in daily operations, the agency and the
public it serves need to weigh the possible effects of using this new technology as
85
a matter of public policy. Opponents of armed drones assert that allowing LEAs
to operate and use armed drones within the United States “would be the latest and
86
arguably most extreme example of the militarization of our police.” The public
is becoming increasingly skeptical of LEAs who continue to acquire the same or
87
similar weapons and tools as the military. A recent poll “finds the American
88
public supports many applications of [drone] technology . . . [r]outine policing
89
though, [was] not among them.” The ACLU believes it will be easier for a LEA
to use force against the public, and therefore “force will be used more . . . [and
armed] [d]rones may also be more likely to result in harm to innocent
90
bystanders.” In 2004, Amnesty International made similar arguments when
91
officers started using tasers to subdue suspects. They expressed concern that
officers were “overusing the Taser . . . because Taser markets it as nonlethal,
[and] officers often use it on unruly suspects, not just as an alternative to deadly
92
force.” The ACLU contends that tasers are unsafe, and that officers continue to

85. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Cusac, The Trouble with Tasers, THE PROGRESSIVE (May 2005), available at
http://progressive.org/mag_amctaser (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the use of tasers by
law enforcement and whether tasers are actually safe to use on humans).
86. Ban on Arming Domestic Drones, supra note 11.
87. See DIANE CECILIA WEBER, WARRIOR COPS: THE OMINOUS GROWTH OF PARAMILITARISM IN
AMERICAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS, CATO INSTITUTE BRIEFING PAPERS 1 (Aug. 26, 1999), available at
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/bp50.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing
how beginning in the 1980s, various police agencies across the United States have been getting trained and
equipped by the U.S. military). “Confusing the police function with the military function can lead to dangerous
and unintended consequences-such as unnecessary shootings and killings.” Id.; see also ACLU Launches
Nationwide Investigation into Police Use of Military Technology & Tactics, ACLU (Mar. 6, 2013),
https://www.aclu.org/criminal-law-reform/aclu-launches-nationwide-investigation-police-use-militarytechnology-tactics (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Equipping state and local law enforcement with
military weapons and vehicles, military tactical training, and actual military assistance to conduct traditional
law enforcement erodes civil liberties and encourages increasingly aggressive policing.”).
88. Query whether Americans would consider using drones for “routine police activity.” See Monmouth
University Poll, U.S. Supports Some Domestic Drone Use, MONMOUTH UNIV. 1 (June 12, 2012), available at
http://www.monmouth.edu/assets/0/32212254770/32212254991/32212254992/3221225
4994/32212254995/30064771087/42e90ec6a27c40968b911ec51eca6000.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (showing a majority of Americans oppose using a drone to enforce speeding violations but support
using a drone for “‘special circumstances’” such as “search and rescue . . . track[ing] down runaway
criminals . . . and control[ing] illegal immigration”).
89. Id.
90. Ban on Arming Domestic Drones, supra note 11.
91. See Alex Berenson, As Police Use of Tasers Soars, Questions Over Safety Emerge, NY TIMES (July 18, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/18/us/as-police-use-of-tasers-soars-questions-over-safety-emerge.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (discussing concerns over taser safety).
92. Id.
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93

overuse them. These same arguments will probably apply to officers using
94
armed drones when they become as common as tasers.
On the other hand, LEAs insist that armed drones would benefit the public by
95
saving officers’ lives. The cost to operate a drone also benefits LEAs because
drones are “much cheaper than helicopters or other aircraft—and they cost much
96
less to operate per hour than do other aircraft.” Additionally, drones “will make
certain activities easier, safer, [and] more efficient . . . [a]t a time when many
97
states are saddled with enormous debt.” Not surprisingly, officers made similar
98
arguments to justify the increasing use of tasers in law enforcement. Despite
concerns, some LEAs will likely provide armed drones to officers as another tool
99
to keep them safe and to reduce costs.
V. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE USE OF FORCE
This section explores how the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment’s “unreasonable seizure” clause established the UOF standard that
applies to officers making arrests and detentions. Additionally, this section
applies the current UOF standard to armed drone use by analogizing to real cases
and scenarios and discusses whether armed drones require a new UOF standard.
A. What Is a Seizure?
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ensures “[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
100
unreasonable searches and seizures.” A person may bring a civil action under
section 1983 against a government actor for a violation of his or her Fourth
101
Amendment rights. In order to bring a section 1983 action, the plaintiff must
102
show that a seizure occurred and that it was unreasonable.
93. See Rebecca McCray & Emma Andersson, Tasers No Longer a Non-Lethal Alternative for Law
Enforcement, ACLU (May 3, 2012, 3:39 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/tasers-no-longernon-lethal-alternative-law-enforcement (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (citing safety issues with
tasers causing “cardiac arrest and death” as well as the “disturbing trend of officers using Tasers in flagrantly
unnecessary situations”); Ban on Arming Domestic Drones, supra note 11 (“Tasers are often used in clearly
unnecessary situations–for example, in retaliation against nonviolent people who have angered a police
officer.”).
94. See supra text accompanying note 90.
95. Sexton, supra note 3.
96. Postel, supra note 28.
97. Id.
98. Berenson, supra note 91 (stating the use of tasers “lowers the risk of injury to officers . . . [a]nd
Tasers are surely safer than firearms.”).
99. See supra text accompanying note 98.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Additionally, a law enforcement officer must have probable cause to seize a
person. Id.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
102. Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989).
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In United States v. Mendenhall, the Court held that “a person has been
‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
103
believed he was not free to leave.” The Court established two instances where a
104
seizure occurs, either through “physical force or [a] show of authority.” Seizure
by physical force occurs when a person or their property is intentionally
105
detained. A seizure “by a show of authority” requires actual submission,
106
otherwise it constitutes an “attempted seizure.”
B. What Is a Reasonable Use of Force?
In Tennessee v. Garner, the Court determined that the “use of deadly force to
prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed suspected felon” was
107
unconstitutional. In Garner, an officer shot a prowler suspect in the back of the
108
head as he was climbing over a chain link fence. The officer believed the
109
suspect would get away if he climbed completely over the fence. The State of
Tennessee, by statute, allowed an officer to use “all the necessary means to effect
110
[an] arrest” of a suspect who flees or resists, including deadly force. The Court
held the statute unconstitutional when used to apply “deadly force against . . .
111
fleeing [nonviolent] suspects.” The Court found that “it is not constitutionally
unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force” only when “the officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm,
112
either to the officer or to others.”
In Graham v. Connor, the Court established the constitutional standard for an
“excessive force [claim] in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or
113
other ‘seizure’ of [a] person.” In Graham, the petitioner, a diabetic, “sustained
a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and an injured shoulder”
because officers utilized physical force when conducting an investigative stop
103. 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). The Court lists several examples of a possible seizure to include: “the
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the
person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s
request might be compelled.” Id.
104. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007).
105. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596 (citations omitted).
106. Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 254.
107. 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985).
108. Id. at 3–4.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id. at 4–5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id. at 11.
112. Id. at 11–12.
(“[I]f the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that
he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical
harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some
warning has been given.”).
113. 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
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114

based on suspicion that he was drunk. The Court held that “all claims that law
enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of
an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather
115
than under a ‘substantive due process’ approach.” Under this rule, “the question
is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts
and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
116
motivation.” Objective reasonableness “requires careful attention to the facts
and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at
issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers
or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest
117
by flight.” The Court also found that the “‘reasonableness’ of a particular use
of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
118
scene.”
In Scott v. Harris, the Court considered whether an officer could use force
that posed a risk of injury or death to a suspect in order to stop the suspect from
119
“endangering the lives of innocent bystanders.” In Scott, an officer attempted a
“Precision Intervention Technique maneuver, which cause[d] the fleeing vehicle
120
to spin to a stop.” The officer incorrectly applied the maneuver to a fleeing
suspect’s vehicle, causing the suspect to crash and sustain permanent, severe
121
injuries. The respondent argued that the officer’s actions amounted to deadly
122
force and therefore the preconditions established in Garner applied to this case.
The Court found that “Garner [does] not establish a magical on/off switch that
triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute ‘deadly
123
force.’” Under the “reasonableness” test set forth in Graham, “all that matters
124
is whether [the officer’s] actions were reasonable.” The Court held that the
reasonableness test includes weighing the “number of lives at risk” and the
125
“relative culpability” of those lives. The officer’s actions were reasonable in

114. Id. at 388–90.
115. Id. at 395.
116. Id. at 397.
117. Id. at 396.
118. Id. at 396–97 (“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”).
119. 550 U.S. 372, 374 (2007).
120. Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Id. (stating the suspect became a quadriplegic).
122. Id. at 381–82 (stating the following preconditions: “(1) The suspect must have posed an immediate
threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others; (2) deadly force must have been necessary to prevent
escape; and (3) where feasible, the officer must have given the suspect some warning”).
123. Id. at 382.
124. Id. at 382–83.
125. Id. at 384.
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this case because “those who might have been harmed had [the officer] not taken
126
the action he did were entirely innocent.”
Courts continue to use the Graham test when analyzing section 1983
127
excessive force claims.
C. Applying the Use of Force Standard to Armed Drone Use
Today, lower courts frequently apply the Supreme Court UOF
128
reasonableness test to section 1983 excessive force claims against LEAs. The
following section analyzes how the use of an armed drone would change the
reasonable UOF analysis in the following cases and scenarios: deploying
129
130
chemical control spray, using a taser, applying lethal force during an armed
131
132
bank robbery, and deploying a K-9 police dog.
1. Using an Armed Drone to Deploy Chemical Control Spray
In a 2013 Louisiana case, Elphage v. Gautreaux, officers detained two
133
individuals suspected of fleeing the scene of a shooting. While officers
detained them, fifteen to twenty people converged on the scene, and another
officer arrived with his K-9 dog “form[ing] a barrier between the crowd and the
134
deputies detaining the two suspects.” The officers verbally warned the crowd
135
that pepper spray would be used “if they did not ‘get back.’” One or more of
136
the officers eventually used pepper spray on the crowd. One member of the
126. Id.
127. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
(“Today we make explicit what was implicit in Garner’s analysis, and hold that all claims that
law enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest,
investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.”).
Scott, 550 U.S. at 383–84 (incorporating a balancing test within the Graham test). In order to overcome
qualified immunity, the plaintiff may also show that the constitutional right was “clearly established.” See
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232–36 (2009) (holding that addressing the “clearly established” prong is
not required in every case).
128. See, e.g., Jackson v. Pena, 28 F. Supp. 3d 423, 429–31 (D.Md. 2014) (applying the Supreme Court
UOF reasonableness test to an excessive force claim for using deadly force).
129. See, e.g., Elphage v. Gautreaux, 939 F. Supp. 2d 493, 497–98 (M.D.La. 2013) (stating an excessive
force claim from chemical control spray).
130. See, e.g., Lash v. Lemke, 971 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 (D.D.C. 2013) (stating an excessive force claim for
deploying a taser).
131. Botched L.A. Bank Heist Turns into Bloody Shootout, CNN (Feb. 28, 1997, 11:10 PM), http://www.
cnn.com/US/9702/28/shootout.update/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
132. See, e.g., White v. City of Lagrange, Ga., 952 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1356–57 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (stating
an excessive force claim for deploying a K-9 dog).
133. 939 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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crowd was arrested for “public intimidation, resisting arrest by force, and simple
137
assault.” The court found that the officer’s actions were “objectively reasonable
under the circumstances” and any injuries members of the crowd suffered were
138
minor.
Suppose that rather than a K-9 officer arriving to keep the crowd back, an
officer arrived and deployed a drone to form a barrier between the crowd and the
officers and give the officers the ability to fire pepper spray from the air. The
officers warned the crowd to stay back or they would be pepper sprayed while an
139
officer at the scene operated the drone with the help of an observer. The crowd
refused to comply, and the drone operator pepper sprayed the crowd.
140
Here, under the Graham standard, a court would likely find that the drone
use was reasonable in light of the belligerent crowd surrounding the officers.
First, the officers dealt with a severe crime—a shooting. Second, the crowd
posed an immediate threat to officer and public safety as it grew more belligerent
and intimidated all of the officers at the scene, including the drone operator.
Finally, because the officer controlling the drone was on the scene and able to
assess the situation, the court would likely conclude that the force was
141
appropriate.
If the officer controlling the drone was not at the scene, a court might find
the UOF unreasonable because the crowd did not pose an immediate danger to
the officer initiating the force by maneuvering the drone and deploying pepper
142
spray. For a court to find the force reasonable, the drone operator would have
to rely on communications with officers actually at the scene before deploying
143
the pepper spray. Additionally, unless an officer at the scene felt threatened or
believed that a member of the public was in danger, a court would likely deem
144
the deployment of pepper spray by a remotely operated drone unreasonable.
In this situation, the analysis of the UOF by the drone and by the officers in
145
the real case is substantially similar. The only difference is how officers
deployed the pepper spray—by hand versus by drone. However, the
137. Id. at 510.
138. Id.
139. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 334(c)(2)(C), 126 Stat. 11,
72–77 (requiring the drone to be “within the line of sight of the operator”).
140. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (stating objective reasonableness “requires careful
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight”). “The calculus of reasonableness must embody
allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation.” Id. at 396–97.
141. “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene.” Id. at 396.
142. See supra notes 139–41.
143. See supra note 139.
144. See supra note 141.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 138–41.
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reasonableness analysis potentially changes once the officer operating the drone
146
is no longer “on the scene.”
2. Using an Armed Drone to Employ a Taser
In a 2013 District of Columbia case, Lash v. Lemke, officers posted notices
on “Occupy DC” protesters’ tents, informing them of the “government’s intent to
147
enforce no-camping regulations.” Officers tased the plaintiff after he removed
148
the notices, attempted to flee the officers, and physically resisted arrest. Video
footage of the arrest showed the plaintiff yelling at the officers and walking away
149
from them, as well as a gathering crowd yelling at the officers. The court found
that the force was reasonable because “the officers were in a hostile environment
where protesters were yelling at and following the officers while [they] attempted
150
to arrest [the plaintiff].” Additionally, the court concluded that a “reasonable
officer on the scene would have believed [the plaintiff] was actively resisting
arrest . . . [and] posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
151
others.”
The plaintiff asserted that he was unarmed and was not threatening at any
152
point during the confrontation. The officers argued, and the court found, that
“[t]here is always a potential threat to officers when they are that close to an
individual who they are trying to arrest, because the individual may try to grab
153
one of the officer’s weapons or actually hit an officer trying to arrest him.” The
plaintiff also claimed that using a taser was unreasonable because the officers did
154
not warn him before using the taser. The court found that “whether a warning is
155
given . . . is not a dispositive factor.”
Suppose the officers deployed a drone armed with a taser device over the
crowd while the officers posted notices of the government’s intent to enforce the
law. An officer operated the drone on site, but did not go with the officers

146. Id.
147. 971 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 (D.D.C. 2013).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 88–90.
150. Id. at 95 (“Viewing the situation from the perspective of an officer at the scene, as the court must,
[the officer’s] use of the taser gun . . . was reasonably proportionate to the difficult and uncertain situation that
the . . . officers faced.”). The court also considered the fact that the officers were among a large protest, there
were many tents within the protest area, and the officers “‘reasonably could have anticipated a confrontation’
while removing an uncooperative protester from the tent camp.” Id.
151. Id. at 96.
152. Id.
153. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Id. at 97.
155. Id. (“An order stating that a warning shall be given ‘if practicable’ cannot be construed to require a
warning in all situations.”). Id. at 98.

561

2014 / Armed Drones for Law Enforcement
156

posting the notices. When the protester physically resisted arrest and fled the
officers, they communicated with the drone operator, giving him a description of
the protester and the direction in which he fled. The drone operator located the
protester with the drone camera, hovered over him, and shot him with a taser
without warning. The officers made their way through the crowd and arrested the
immobilized protester.
Here, the protester never posed an immediate threat to the drone operator
157
because he was not near the operator at any point during the confrontation.
Additionally, while the protester was attempting to evade arrest, he did not pose
an immediate threat to the officers when he was tased because he was not close
158
to them. The protester could also argue that he had not committed a severe
159
crime because he was unarmed and simply tearing down notices. Finally, he
could present evidence that the officers failed to warn him that a drone would
160
taser him if he refused to stop.
On the other hand, because the officers faced a hostile crowd while trying to
make an arrest, a court might hold the use of force reasonable. Additionally, a
court would likely find that, because the officers had already tried and failed to
arrest the protestor, the officers reasonably believed that the protestor was
161
evading arrest. However, because neither the drone operator nor the pursuing
officers faced immediate danger from the protester at the time the drone operator
162
deployed the taser, a court would likely find the force unreasonable. There is no
evidence to suggest that the protester posed an immediate threat of harm to others
because the crowd was part of his same protest. If the protester had been standing
around the crowd waving a firearm at everyone, there would be a stronger case
for deploying a taser via drone because the protestor would pose an immediate
threat to others and officers would not be able to get close to the protester to
163
make an arrest.
In this situation, the analysis of the UOF by the drone and by the officers in
the real case is different because the real case involved officers in close
proximity to the suspect, whereas in the drone scenario the officers were some
distance away from the suspect and not in immediate danger. The crowd might

156. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 334(c)(2)(C), 126 Stat. 11,
72–77 (2012) (requiring the drone to be “within the line of sight of the operator”).
157. See supra note 140.
158. See supra note 140.
159. Id.
160. See supra text accompanying note 155.
161. See supra text accompanying note 150.
162. See Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867, 883 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding officers’ use of pepperball
projectiles to disperse a party was unreasonable because there was no evidence the officers were in immediate
danger).
163. See supra note 140.
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have threatened officers, but a court would still likely find the deployment of a
164
taser by drone unreasonable.
3. Using a Lethally Armed Drone
In 1997, two heavily-armed men unsuccessfully tried to rob a bank in North
165
Hollywood, California. After police responded to the bank robbery, the
166
suspects made their escape by moving into a crowded neighborhood. For an
167
hour, the suspects and police exchanged gunfire. “Wearing body armor and
carrying a trunk full of weapons, the robbers . . . fired armor-piercing bullets at
168
anything that moved, and one suspect used a getaway car as a shield.”
Eventually, both suspects were “killed by helmeted police who fired bullets to
169
the head at close range.”
Now suppose during this intense gun battle officers deployed a drone armed
with a twelve-gauge shotgun. An officer operated a drone from a mobile
command center set up a few blocks from the bank and had been tracking the
suspects the entire time. Once officers surrounded the two suspects on a
neighborhood street, they radioed the drone operator to open fire because they
could not get close enough to shoot the suspects and they judged the situation
safe enough for drone use. The drone operator fatally shot both suspects from the
air, ending the standoff.
Here, a court would clearly find that deadly force is reasonable because the
suspects posed a serious threat of physical harm to officers and the general
170
public. While the dangerous situation clearly justified the officers’ use of
deadly force, they could not shoot because the gunmen were continually firing at
them. A court would likely find that a reasonable officer at the scene could
command the drone operator to use deadly force. Therefore, the force would
almost certainly be reasonable because the drone operator received a direct
171
command to use deadly force based on observations of an officer at the scene.
In this situation, the UOF analysis for using the drone parallels the UOF
analysis for an on-scene officer shooting because an on-scene officer ordered the
drone to fire and the suspects clearly posed a threat to the officers on the scene

164. See Nelson, 685 F.3d at 883 (finding there was a clear distinction between individuals posing an
immediate threat to officers and the plaintiff who was not an immediate threat).
165. Botched L.A. Bank Heist Turns into Bloody Shootout, supra note 131.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 818 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding an officer’s use of deadly
force was reasonable against an armed robbery suspect who fled the scene of the robbery and was “lying in
wait” in a residential area).
171. See supra note 140.
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and the public. Additionally, even if the drone operator had fired without being
told to do so by officers, a court may find the action reasonable because the
officer could determine the suspects were a threat to the public based on what the
173
officer could see with the drone camera.
4. Pursuit Using an Armed Drone Instead of a K–9 Dog
In 2010, an officer responded to a call about a possible kidnapper walking
174
down a street. The officer found the suspect and told him to “place his hands on
175
the patrol car.” The suspect would not let the officer get behind him despite a
176
warning that the officer “could deploy his K–9 if necessary.” When the suspect
started running, the officer “deployed his K–9, which caught up with [the
177
suspect] and bit him on the arm.” The court compared this case to an earlier
case where an armed robbery suspect crashed his car after being pursued by
178
multiple officers and then ran into the woods. In that case, the court held that
the officer reasonably deployed the K–9 because, along with other factors, “all
179
180
three of the Graham factors weighed heavily against the plaintiff.” In White,
the court found that the suspect “was suspected of the serious crime of felony
kidnapping and was actively fleeing from [the officer], creating a danger to the
181
community.” The court also reasoned that, because the officer was alone, “his
need to use the K–9 to ensure his safety and the safety of the community was
182
even greater” and therefore the officer reasonably used his K–9.
Suppose both officers who responded to the call were trained and certified
drone operators who carried the police drone in the trunk of their vehicle. Despite
warning the suspect that they would deploy a drone armed with beanbag rounds
to pursue him, the suspect fled. The officers deployed their drone, found the
suspect, and shot him with several beanbag rounds to keep him from fleeing.
Here, a court would likely find that the use of force by a drone was as
reasonable as deploying a K–9 in White because (1) the scenario fell within the
183
Graham factors, (2) both officers who used the drone were actually at the

172. Id.
173. See infra Part V.D (discussing how a court could analyze the reasonableness of an officer using an
armed drone without guidance from an officer on the scene).
174. White v. City of Lagrange, Ga., 952 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2013).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1356–57.
178. Id. at 1358.
179. The court found that “the plaintiff was suspected of armed robbery, . . . actively fled from the police,
and . . . the police had every reason to believe that he was armed and dangerous.” Id.
180. Id. at 1358.
181. Id. at 1359.
182. Id.
183. See supra note 179.
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scene, (3) there were only two officers on site and trying to pursue the suspect
185
would create a greater danger to others, and (4) the officers warned the suspect
186
that they would deploy the drone if he fled the scene.
D. Do Armed Drones Require a New Use of Force Standard?
In applying the Graham standard to the use of an armed drone instead of an
officer, it becomes clear that some factors are more dispositive than others. For
187
example, “the severity of the crime at issue” analysis remains the same
regardless of whether an officer or a drone applies the force because both would
188
require that the level of force match the severity of the crime. For example, it
would be unreasonable for an officer or a drone to shoot a shoplifter with a
189
twelve-gauge shotgun to stop the crime of theft. Therefore, this factor should
be included in an armed drone UOF standard. Another factor unchanged by
drone use is whether the suspect is “actively resisting arrest or attempting to
190
evade arrest by flight.” Standing alone, this factor would not change how a
court looks at the reasonableness of UOF, either by drone or by officer, because
both would depend on how strongly the suspect resists arrest or what methods a
191
suspect uses in an attempt to flee. Therefore, this factor should also be part of
an armed drone UOF standard.
The most dispositive Graham factor requires a court to judge “[t]he
‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force . . . from the perspective of a
192
reasonable officer on the scene.”
The Supreme Court explained that
“reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a
193
particular situation.” How would an officer pass the “on the scene” perspective
the Court requires when the officer is in a building relying only on the armed
drone’s camera to make a decision to use force against a suspect on the street?
While most officers are capable of making split-second judgments on the street
or at the scene, officers operating drones have limited perspectives of the

184. See supra note 140.
185. See supra text accompanying note 179.
186. See supra text accompanying note 140.
187. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
188. See supra text accompanying note 112.
189. Id.
190. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
191. See Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867, 883 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating officers’ use of pepperball
projectiles against individuals at a party was unreasonable force because “the officers had no interest in
arresting them; and the group engaged in passive resistance, at most, by failing to immediately disperse if and
when such an order was given”).
192. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
193. Id. at 396–97.
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situation. Therefore, without more, this factor would almost always lead a court
to decide an officer’s use of an armed drone was unreasonable because the
195
officer controlling the drone was not “on the scene.”
Another problematic factor for armed drones under the standard UOF
analysis is “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
196
officers or others.” Obviously, suspects on the street do not pose an immediate
threat to the officer operating the drone from a safe distance. But what if the
officer can clearly see the suspect shooting people and no officer is at the scene?
The officer can reasonably believe the suspect “poses an immediate threat to the
safety of . . . others” because the officer can see the suspect shooting people
197
through the drone camera. A court might find the UOF reasonable if the officer
operating the drone could see that the suspect was about to injure a fellow officer
on the street. In Scott v. Harris, the Court said “it is clear from the videotape that
respondent posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians
who might have been present, to other civilian motorists, and to the officers
198
involved in the chase.” If officers recorded the drone camera feed, the court
could analyze the immediate threat to safety similarly to the way it analyzed the
199
issue in Scott.
Here, assuming the court did use the drone camera footage to find an
imminent threat to public safety, the question remains: how does the lack of an
200
officer on the scene affect the reasonable UOF analysis? In Scott, the officers
201
were on the scene at all times in pursuit of the suspect. In order for a court to
find the UOF reasonable in the limited circumstances where the officer via drone
camera perceived—and the drone footage clearly showed—that the suspect
posed a clear and imminent threat to public safety, it must deviate from the
Graham standard because it could no longer judge the “reasonableness of a
particular use of force . . . from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
202
scene.” Therefore, in limited circumstances, courts must essentially expand the
definition of “on the scene” to include the “perspective of a reasonable officer”
203
watching the scene through a drone camera.
However, use of an armed drone falls completely within the current Graham
standard in some circumstances. For example, having an officer on the scene
either controlling the drone or directing an off-scene drone operator will likely
meet the “reasonable officer on the scene” factor because the circumstances
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
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See supra text accompanying notes 192–93.
Id.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Id.
550 U.S. 372, 384 (2007) (emphasis added).
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 197.
Scott, 550 U.S. at 379–80.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See supra text accompanying note 201.
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involve someone physically present where the force will occur. The size of the
scene is irrelevant. So long as an officer is directing the drone or drone operator
to engage in force based on the Graham reasonableness factors, a court would
likely find such use of an armed drone reasonable and no different than any other
205
law enforcement tool. However, specific situations will undoubtedly arise
requiring courts to either modify the current Graham standard to expand the “on
the scene” factor or find the use of an armed drone unreasonable within the
206
current standard. Until then, LEAs who desire to use armed drones will need to
create an armed drone UOF policy that conforms to the existing Graham
207
standard.
VI. CREATING A LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF FORCE POLICY
FOR ARMED DRONES
The following section considers actual UOF policies that state and federal
LEAs have implemented and proposes a model UOF policy that encompasses the
Graham standard while also seeking to minimize public skepticism over armed
drone use.
A. Current Law Enforcement Use of Force Policies
Based on the reasonableness standards established by the Supreme Court, all
state and federal LEAs have policies designed to minimize excessive force
208
claims.
1. State LEA Use of Force Policies
The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department states that “determining
209
whether force is ‘unreasonable’ shall be consistent with [Graham v. Connor].”
The policy also defines “objectively reasonable” to mean that “[d]epartment
members shall evaluate each situation requiring the use of force in light of the
known circumstances . . . in determining the necessity for force and the
210
appropriate level of force.”

204. See supra Part V.C.1.
205. Id.
206. Scott, 550 U.S. at 381–83 “[I]n the end, we must still slosh our way through the factbound morass of
‘reasonableness.’” Id. at 383.
207. Infra Part VI.B.
208. Infra Part VI.A.1–2.
209. L.A. CNTY. SHERIFF USE OF FORCE POLICY 2, available at http://www.lasdhq.org/divisions/
leadership-training-div/bureaus/mpp/force-policy.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
210. Id. (listing examples of known circumstances to include: “the severity of the crime at issue, whether
the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the member of others, and whether the suspect is actively
resisting”).
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The Chicago Police Department gives the same reasonableness guidelines as
the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, but also gives its officers a UOF
Model “in order to provide members guidance on the reasonableness of a
211
particular response option.” The UOF Model classifies an individual interacting
212
with an officer as a “cooperative subject,” “resister,” or “assailant.” When a
person is considered a resister or assailant, the model gives increasing methods of
213
physical control over the individual. For example, an officer may begin by
214
physically holding a person who qualifies as a resister. As the resister becomes
increasingly difficult to control, the officer may use chemical spray, a taser, or a
215
canine. If the person moves into the assailant category, the officer may use
216
impact weapons, munitions, or deadly force.
The Boston Police Department (BPD) has three separate policies that outline
217
218
219
the use of non-lethal force, less lethal force, and deadly force. In the nonlethal force policy, the BPD includes the Graham v. Connor rule regarding use of
220
force. The policy generally restricts non-lethal force to “defensive situations
where (1) an officer or other person is attacked, or (2) an officer is met with
221
physical resistance during an encounter.” The policy also allows an officer to
211. CHI. POLICE DEP’T, USE OF FORCE GUIDELINES, GEN. ORDER G03–02, CHICAGOPOLICE.ORG (last
updated Sept. 23, 2002), http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-8fff44306f3da7b28a19.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
212. CHI. POLICE DEP’T, THE USE OF FORCE MODEL, GEN. ORDER G03–02–01, CHICAGOPOLICE.ORG
(last updated May 16, 2012), http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-8fffcec11383d806e05f.html?ownapi=1 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULES & PROCEDURES, RULE 304 - USE OF NON-LETHAL FORCE (Apr. 29,
2013), available at http://static.squarespace.com/static/5086f19ce4b0ad16ff15598d/t/52af5f43e4b0dbce9d2
2a824/1387224899721/Rule%20304.pdf [hereinafter BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULE 304CUSE OF NON-LETHAL
FORCE] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (defining non-lethal force as “that amount of force that will
generally not result in serious bodily injury or death”).
218. BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULES & PROCEDURES, RULE 303A - USE OF LESS-LETHAL FORCE (June 22,
2000), available at http://static.squarespace.com/static/5086f19ce4b0ad16ff15598d/t/52af5f3ae4b0dbce9d22a
81a/1387224890009/Rule%20303A.pdf [hereinafter BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULE 303ACUSE OF LESS-LETHAL
FORCE] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Less-Lethal Force Philosophy is a concept of planning and
force application that meets operational objectives, with less potential for causing death or serious physical
injury than the use of deadly force.”).
219. BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULES & PROCEDURES, RULE 303 - USE OF DEADLY FORCE (Apr. 11, 2003),
available at http://static.squarespace.com/static/5086f19ce4b0ad16ff15598d/t/52af5f30e4b0dbce9d22a80d/
1387224880253/Rule%20303.pdf [hereinafter BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULE 303C USE OF DEADLY FORCE] (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (defining deadly force as “that degree of force likely to result in death or great
bodily injury”).
220. BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULE 304 - USE OF NON-LETHAL FORCE, supra note 217,
(“The ‘Reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from [the] perspective of
[a] reasonable officer on the scene, and its calculus must embody an allowance for the fact that
police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount of force
necessary in a particular situation.”).
221. Id.
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use non-lethal force when encountering “passive resistance,” but the force must
222
be reasonable “based on the totality of the circumstances.” The less-lethal
policy is specifically tailored for the use of a twelve gauge “less lethal shotgun”
223
and “flexible projectile rounds.” This policy is used for “the de-escalation of
224
potentially violent situations.” The deadly force policy outlines when an officer
225
may discharge his or her firearm.
2. Federal LEA Use of Force Policies
According to its website, the FBI requires “a reasonable belief that the
subject of [deadly] force poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical
226
injury to the agent or another person.” The FBI also encourages agents to give a
227
verbal warning to comply before using deadly force.
The CBP recently completed a review of its current UOF policy and made
changes based on several recommendations from its UOF Policy Division, the
Police Executive Research Forum, and the DHS Office of the Inspector
228
General. The CBP’s new UOF handbook includes the objective reasonableness
229
standards outlined in Graham and Garner. The CBP has the same deadly force
230
standard as the FBI.
Whether stated explicitly or implicitly, all of the UOF policies or practices
appear to use the Graham standard to determine the proper use of force for any
231
given situation.
B. A Model Armed Drone Use of Force Policy
Using the Graham standard as well as some of the internal rules used in
current UOF policies, the following model policy incorporates specific rules
based on the use of armed drones:

222. Id.
223. BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULE 303A - USE OF LESS-LETHAL FORCE, supra note 218.
224. Id.
225. BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULE 303 - USE OF DEADLY FORCE, supra note 219.
226. Frequently Asked Questions, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/faqs (last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
227. Id.
228. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION USE OF FORCE REVIEWS, RECOMMENDATIONS, & NEXT
STEPS, Border Security, CBP, available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/bs/force_reviews.xml
(last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
229. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, USE OF FORCE POLICY, GUIDELINES & PROCEDURES
HANDBOOK 1–2 (May 2014), available at http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/UseofForcePolicy
Handbook.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
230. Id. at 3.
231. See supra Part VI.A.
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I.

Armed Drone Use of Force Policy

A. A LEA will follow all applicable FAA regulations as well as state
and federal laws regarding the operation of drones.
B. When practical, an officer will notify the LEA supervisor that an
armed drone has been deployed at a specific incident.
C. Unless clearly contrary to an objective measure of reasonableness,
the LEA supervisor shall approve every request by an officer at the
scene to use the non-lethal or lethal drone weapons against a suspect
or suspects.
D. An officer who wishes to utilize a drone armed with non-lethal or
lethal weapons as a use of force will make the decision under an
232
objective reasonableness standard. Non-inclusive circumstances
considered in the reasonableness standard include: (1) “the severity
of the crime at issue,” (2) “whether the subject poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others,” and (3) “whether [the
subject] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
233
flight.”
E. At no time will an officer controlling a drone act alone and use the
drone to apply force on an individual, unless the drone operator is at
the scene of the incident or, if not at the scene, the drone operator has
received clear communication from an officer at the scene directing
the operator to use the drone to apply force.
Because the FAA authorizes LEAs to use drones in their daily operations, the
LEA risks losing its ability to operate drones if it fails to comply with applicable
234
federal laws, regulations, or state laws.
While there is nothing in the Graham standard that asks whether an officer
notified or sought approval from a supervisor, some current LEA UOF policies
require or suggest that an officer obtain permission prior to using certain less235
lethal weapons. Because these same less-lethal weapons are now mounted on
the drone, it is likely wise to apply the same approval standard to minimize
232. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989).
233. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (stating the factors used in many UOF policies).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 67–69; Part III.B–C (noting the lack of federal regulation on
armed drones and various state approaches to armed drones).
235. See, e.g., L.A. CNTY. SHERIFF USE OF FORCE POLICY, supra note 209, at 40 (stating that chemical
agents “may be authorized by the Watch Commander or, if applicable, the Incident Commander, or by a
Sergeant). The policy also states that “[p]rior to the use of [a taser], whenever practical, Department personnel
shall request a supervisor.” Id. at 42. The officer who applied the “Precision Intervention Technique” in Scott v.
Harris also requested and received permission from his supervisor prior to applying the maneuver. 550 U.S.
372, 375 (2007).
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public outcry or excessive force claims. However, the policy provides flexibility
by acknowledging that there will be times when an officer cannot practically
obtain approval from a supervisor prior to using force via drone.
Since the Graham standard applies, it is only logical to include the actual
language of the case within the drone policy. This ensures officers know what
test they must comply with when using reasonable force. Specifically, the policy
defines the circumstances where an officer utilizing a drone will meet the “on the
236
scene” judgment of reasonable force that the Graham court requires.
In some situations, an officer controlling an armed drone from a building two
miles away may have a reasonable belief, judging by what the officer can see
from the drone camera, that force is necessary despite the fact that no officer is
237
on the scene. The question remains whether a court will expand the “on the
scene” reasonableness definition in the UOF analysis to include specific
instances where an officer can perceive just enough from the drone camera to
238
qualify as “on the scene” under the existing standard. Until then, this policy
will allow officers to use armed drones and still remain within the established
239
UOF standard under Graham.
VII. CONCLUSION
The FAA Act opened American skies to drones—it is only a matter of time
240
before they become a common sight overhead. As more LEAs obtain drones
241
for everyday police use and the federal and state budgets continue to shrink,
242
interest in arming these drones with non-lethal and lethal weapons will grow. It
243
is probably constitutional for a LEA to use armed drones in daily operations,
but LEAs face an uphill climb to convince a skeptical public that using armed
236. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
237. See supra Part V.D. One could also question how useful armed drones may have been during
situations where it was simply not feasible to have an officer on the scene. See, e.g., Jim Crogan, For 22 Murder
Victims, LA Riots Leave Legacy of Justice Eluded, FOXNEWS (Apr. 29, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/
2012/04/29/for-22-murder-victims-la-riots-leave-legacy-justice-eluded/ (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (noting five days of riots and violence in Los Angeles requiring the National Guard to provide support
to the police); Joseph B. Treaster, Life-or-Death Words of the Day in a Battered City: ‘I Had to Get Out’, NY
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/31/national/nationalspecial/31orleans.html?ref
=hurricanekatrina&_r=0 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting armed looting during Hurricane
Katrina and how police were “‘almost completely involved in saving lives and not in guarding [New
Orleans]’”).
238. See supra Part V.D.
239. See supra notes 140–41.
240. See Kim, supra note 12, at 54 (“[T]he aviation industry expects that 30,000 [drones] may soon fill
domestic skies conducting operations that were until now unthinkable or cost-prohibitive.”).
241. See Chuang, supra note 9 (noting the need for cost-cutting measures in law enforcement agencies).
242. See Sexton, supra note 3 (stating an opinion of a Texas LEA that “drones armed with an array of
non-lethal force options—including impact rounds, chemical munition rounds, and tasers—could save lives”);
Chuang, supra note 9 (stating LEAs are considering drones as a “cost-cutting way to replace helicopters, and
use technology to fight crime and save lives”).
243. See supra Part III.
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244

drones is a good idea. As the Graham v. Connor standard states, whether an
officer’s actions are “objectively reasonable”—and therefore not excessive—
245
“must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.”
Until the Supreme Court develops a different standard or modifies the “on the
scene” standard to incorporate an officer’s perspective from a drone camera,
LEAs will need to develop a drone UOF policy that will not only meet the
246
Graham standard, but also protect the public from abuse.

244. See supra Part IV.
245. 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989).
246. See supra Part VI.B.
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